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KRIPKE'S DOUBTS ABOUT MEANING 
Franz von Kutschera 
In his book Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (1982) Saul Kripke 
has proposed an interpretation of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations 
(1953), at the center of which Stands a new sceptical paradox and a sceptical So-
lution to this paradox.1 This interpretation is strongly contested. I myself don't 
believe it to be correct, however I won't engage here in questions about inter-
pretation—Colin McGinn has already offered the most important remarks on 
this in the first two chapters of his (1984)—but I will say something about the 
paradox itself and its Solution. Kripke emphasizes that he only intends to 
provide a deeper understanding of Wittgenstein^ Statements rather than an 
evaluation (viz. WR, IX, pp.5, 31), and yet I will speak of the "Kripkean para-
dox" since one can hardly attribute it to Wittgenstein. I will try to show that 
there is a direct Solution to the paradox, that the argument for the sceptical 
thesis is invalid, and that the sceptical Solution offers no escape from the scep-
tical challenge. Others have already done this, an especially comprehensive ac-
count has been offered by C. McGinn (1984), but since Kripke's thoughts con-
ünue to fascinate,2 it is perhaps useful to give once again a systematic analysis 
of Kripke's position. 
1. The New Sceptical Paradox 
"Wittgenstein has invented a new form of scepticism. Personally I am inclined 
to regard it as the most radical and original problem that philosophy has seen to 
date", Kripke writes (WR, p.60). This new form of scepticism goes far beyond 
epistemological scepticism, debated since the Ancients, which maintains that 
we cannot teil whether our Statements about the world are true or false. Stronger 
still is the scepticism about linguistic reference, according to which we cannot 
be certain whether we are saying anything about the world with our statemenLs 
because we can't be sure that the terms we employ signify objectively existing 
things. If the terms don't signify, then the Statements don't express any existing 
or nonexisting State of affairs in the world. Epistemological scepticism, like the 
scepticism about linguistic reference, begins from an ontological realism, mean-
I abbreviate these two works in the following by WR and PI. Quotations from WR 
are referred to by page numbers, quotations from PI by paragraphs. 
Cf. Stegmüller (1986). 
ing that the world in its existence and form is independent of human thought 
and experience. This independence, in certain formulations, grows into a tran-
scendence of reality to our knowledge and speech. Therefore, authors such as 
Nelson Goodman, Hilary Putnam and Richard Rorty have given up realism. But 
when faced with meaning scepticism the withdrawal from realism is no escape, 
because meaning scepticism is not about whether Statements about the world 
express objectively existent or nonexistent states of affairs, but rather about 
whether they express well defined states of affairs at all, no matter if of an ob-
jective or a subjective nature. Kripke* s scepticism is such a meaning scepti-
cism. In fact, this form is not quite new, the Sophists had already debated about 
whether all of the sentences of ordinary language are vague, in the sense that 
there are always several interpretations of a sentence assigning different truth-
values to it, But Kripke has given the meaning scepticism a new form and 
foundation by using ideas he found in Wittgenstein. This scepticism is con-
cerned not so much with the intersubjective meaning of linguistic expressions, 
but rather with the Speaker's meaning, that, what he intends to express by the 
expression. 
Kripke shows the paradox by offering an example about how we use the word 
'plus' (WR, pp.7-22). In reference to a one-place predicate F , the sceptical 
thesis reads as follows: 
T) There is no criterion for whether the application of F by a Speaker X to 
some new object a is correct—that is to say, an object to which X has 
not yet attributed the predicate F or thought of in connection with his ap-
plications of F. 
The justification of this thesis looks like this: the application of F to a by X 
is correct, iff X has up to this point already associated a certain meaning with Z7, 
that is, X has meant a certain property E by / \ and a indeed has this property E. 
But there is no fact which would establish that X has so far meant the property 
E by F. The following are the only candidates for such a fact: 
a) The past applications of F by X. However, these applications are consis-
tent with the assumption that so far X has meant by F a property E' which is 
different from £, for instance a Goodman-like counterpart of £, that is to say an 
E' that fits exactly all those objects which either X has taken into consideration 
before the present time / and which have the property £ , or which X has not 
taken into consideration before / and which do not have the quality E. 
b) The previous intentions of X concerning the use of F , that is to say the in-
tentions concerning future uses of F in certain cases. The same argument 
against candidate (a) also holds good here. 
c) X's choice of a certain general definition of F or some general criteria for 
the use of F. But had X for example decided to connect F with objects for which 
the predicates G and H also obtain, this pushes the problem only one step away, 
because one still faces the question of which criteria X might have used to 
associate G and H with a particular meaning (WR, pp. 15ff.). 
d) X has associated with F or F-applications certain psychological states 
(emotions, sensations) which may be introspectively experienced. But it is un-
clear what kind of states these could be or even how subjective experiences can 
distinguish properties of objects. How does the fact that the new object a 
produces in me the same feeling as was produced by earlier F-instances justify 
my application of F to al 
e) X has acquired certain dispositions to use F . Kripke objects against this, 
first, that dispositions of X to use F do not uniquely correspond to the possible 
meanings which X assigns to F : occasional applications of F by X to objects 
which don't have the property E don't necessarily show that X doesn't mean E 
by F. Dispositions exhibit a factual behavior, but lack normative character; they 
don't admit of the distinction between correct and incorrect applications. 
Secondly, for Kripke our dispositions are finite, i.e. they are determined for only 
finitely many cases, while properties are defined for a potentially infinite num-
ber of cases (WR, pp.22-37). 
What holds for monadic predicates also holds for polyadic predicates, func-
tional expressions, sentential Operators, and even, as McGinn has emphasized, 
for names.3 Thus, the septical argument concerns all linguistic expressions. 
Kripke rightly emphasizes that this scepticism is not about the reliability of 
memory: for even if X or another person is completely informed about the en-
tire behavioral and mental history of X , he cannot ascertain whether X has, up 
to this point, meant the property E by F. According to Kripke, it follows from 
this that there is no fact which constitutes X ' s having-meant-F-by-F (WR, 
pp.21). The sceptical thesis T is also not meant as a form of truth-scepticism, 
for one can assume in the context of Kripke's discussion that the application of 
F to a is true or false and that there are also criteria for establishing Claims of 
this kind. Finally, T is not an epistemological scepticism. It doesn't concern 
the question of whether I can know that a has the property F, nor whether others 
can know what I mean by my use of F . 
The consequence of the sceptical arguments is thus: if there is no fact that 
someone has meant something by some word in the past, then there can be no 
fact that he means something by his use of it right now, for otherwise it would 
be a fact tomorrow that he has, in the past, meant something by it (WR, p.21). 
The result seems to be a total nihilism of meaning. The reference to a meaning 
in the past was only a tactical move on the part of the sceptic in order to avoid 
being susceptible right from the Start to the objection that, if there were no fact 
3 Cf. McGinn (1984, pp.Hlf . ) . 
of his meaning something by what he said, his theses and arguments would be 
senseless. 
2. A Direct Solution of the Problem 
Kripke suspects (WR, p.5) that to attempt to present the sceptical argument 
precisely is to some extent to falsify i t I share this conjecture. The argument 
will probably sound quite implausible to the unprejudiced reader given a brief 
description like the one I gave.4 For obviously the list of candidates for facts 
that could establish the claim that X has meant the property E by his use of F 
is incomplete. One would claim that the fact for which Kripke is looking just is 
the fact that X has meant E by F. But Kripke is Willing to countenance facts of 
meaning, i.e. semantical facts in the wider sense, only if they are reducible to 
other, non-semantic facts. I will refer to this supposition in what follows as the 
"critical premise" of the sceptical argument. Although it is by no means plaus-
ible, Kripke offers no further justification for this premise. Many mental predic-
ates, like "believing", "seeing" and "wanting", are not definable by others, but 
this does not imply that they are senseless or that the phenomena of believing, 
seeing and wanting do not exist.5 The practical or even principal impossibility 
of defining meaning with the help of only non-semantical concepts implies 
nothing about the existence of facts of meaning, just as the non-reducibility of 
the mental to the physical does not call the existence of the mental into ques-
tion. 
Now Wittgenstein criticizes the conception according to which the under-
standing of a (monadic) predicate consists in grasping the property for which it 
Stands. Indeed, the grasping of universals considered as platonistic entities, as 
Frege has described it, for instance, is an obscure business.6 According to Witt-
genstein, a predicate does not obtain its meaning through the assignment of a 
property to it, but rather by its being used in a certain way. Consequently, its 
use should not be explained by reference to a property, but, on the contrary, the 
property expressed by it should be explained by its use. Because this approach is 
attractive in several ways, I want to show that even from its point of view there 
is a fact of the matter concerning the understanding of a predicate, and, therefore, 
that this approach does not imply the Kripkean paradox. 
4 To avoid the suspicion to have represented Kripke's arguments in an incorrect or 
unfair way, I have kept very close to his own formulations, as the comparison 
with WR, pp.8-22 will show. 
5 Similar remarks have been made by McGinn (1984, pp.lSlff.) and Wright (1984). 
6 Cf. Kutschera (1989, ch. 10). 
Wittgenstein and Kripke say a lot about the "use" of linguistic expressions, 
but they haven't taken the troubie to explain this notoriously ambiguous term. 
By the "use" of a term we normally mean the way, type or mode of its use, but 
Kripke and even Wittgenstein sometimes mean the set of particular cases in 
which the term has been used, the set of its applications, the tokens as against 
the type of its use. Moreover, in both cases one can mean either the correct or 
the actual use. Wittgenstein discusses modes of use under the title of "following 
a rule". The expression 'rule* is ambiguous, too: a rule can be an explicitly for-
mulated Instruction or maxim or it can be a regularity. According to Wittgen-
stein, one follows a rule if one behaves in a certain way, that is if one's be-
havior exhibits a certain regularity. He emphasizes that one need not have an ex-
plicit Instruction in one's head which guides one's behavior.7 This way of 
speaking is unfortunate, because "following a rule" usually means that one 
obeys an explicit rule and is being guided by i t But, if we follow Wittgen-
stein^ way of speaking, then, for him, the possibility of following instructions 
presupposes the ability to follow a rule,8 individually as well as collectively. 
This ability, for him, is a basic fact which cannot be further explained. A l -
though Kripke doesn't off er a clear discussion of this point, we must interpret 
him as denying the possibility of following a rule as an individual and of an in-
dividual mode of behavior. Kripke interprets Wittgenstein incorrectly when he 
makes reference to the following claim: "Hence it is not possible to obey a rule 
"privately": otherwise thinking one was obeying a rule would be the same as 
obeying it." (PI, §202). 'Privately' ('privatim*) does not mean here "only for 
oneself \ but rather "not public". Wittgenstein allows only for those types of 
behavior which consist in the fact that someone reacts in an intersubjectively 
observable manner to intersubjectively observable conditions.9 For Kripke, on 
the contrary, individual dispositions of behaviour are "finite", as we have seen 
(WR, p.26ff.), i.e. they are defined for only finitely many cases, and, therefore, 
they don't determine modes of behavior, but only classes of instances of be-
havior. Thus, Kripke denies that individual persons, within a limited span of 
time, really behave in a certain manner, he Claims instead that there are only the 
instances of behavior during this time. But this is not only un-Wittgenstein-
7 Wittgenstein even says that an (explicit) rule as a maxime which one chooses for 
oneself can never determine a type of behaviour; cf. PI, §201. 
8 This is emphasized by Baker and Hacker in (1984) and McGinn in (1984). Witt-
genstein accepts, for example in PI, §187, counterfactual conditionals about 
individual behavior, in particular about the use of words; and he can do this only if 
he accepts types of individual behavior. His critique is directed only against the 
view that the use of a word is explained by reference to an abstract entity of mean-
ing, by an explicit rule or by mental images. 
9 Similar McGinn (1984, p.79). 
ian—it is absurd: a behavioral disposition is not a finite class of pairs of con-
creto situations or Stimuli and concrete responses to them. We can explain a 
Single response in terms of a disposition, but an explanation in terms of a class 
of stimulus-response pairs would be circular. If there is a behavioural disposi-
tion we can say that " i f this Situation would have occurred, he would have 
reacted in this manner", but, stimulus-response pairs are not a basis for such 
counterfactual conditionals. Moreover, an application of a predicate, as Kripke 
thinks about it, is already a mode of use. It does not just consist in the fact that 
a particular Speaker applies F to an object a at a certain time f, but in the fact 
that the Speaker generally (at different times) applies F to a, or that everyone 
applies F t oa . 1 0 
Now, Kripke's paradox is not just about a person X using a predicate F in a 
certain manner, but rather about him using it in a certain sense, understanding it 
in a certain way. 1 1 If we can maintain that, we can also say of Single instances 
of the use of F by X that they are correct or incorrect, i.e., either that they 
correspond to the sense which X associates with F or they don't correspond (for 
example because X has made a slip of tongue). Now we can claim that X under-
stands the predicate F in the way he uses it intentionally. For instance, I use the 
predicate 'red' in order to describe red things. Therefore I understand it as a 
means of describing red things, if I wish to describe something as red and use 
the word in this intention. Thus Kripke must deny that there is something like 
intentionally following a rule. But again, this is completely implausible, be-
cause there are certainly techniques which we apply in certain situations and 
which, if applied in such a way, are cases of intentional behavior. "Intentional" 
does not mean that one must first make a detailed plan of how to proceed and 
then carry out the plan in practice. In most cases, a technique also does not con-
sist in following explicit Instructions or maxims, but rather consists in an in-
tuitive knowledge of how to do something, which results from the experience of 
previous behavior. For example, I have acquired a certain technique for moun-
tain climbing, which has been successful and which guides my behavior in 
climbing. I could not give a detailed description of it, but I intuitively know 
what I have to do, even in new situations provided they are not too different 
from those which I have previously experienced I "blindly follow the rule" (PI, 
§219), which does not mean "I continue in an arbitrary manner", but rather that 
Cf. also Hoffman (1985, p.24). 
In sentences of the form 'Someone understands the word A in this and this way' 
the verb 'understand' is not an epistemic success verb like in 'Somebody under-
stands the word A\ The second sentence says that somebody knows how A is 
generally applied, i.e., that he knows A's intersubjective meaning. However, this 
is not implied by the first sentence. Here A may also be a word of the private idio-
lect of the person. 
"I don't need any explicit Instruction, because my intuition teils me what to 
do". Such a technique does not determine my behavior, for I may deviate from it 
in certain cases, intentionally or non-intenüonally. The rule guides my behavior 
only if I want to be guided by it, and even then only if there is no unconscious 
mistake. Our ability to speak is such a technique, i.e. an intuitive knowledge of 
how to use words and sentences for certain purposes. We apply predicates with a 
high degree of certainty, provided that the necessary factual information is at our 
disposal. We know how to apply predicates even if we can't give a complete 
description of this knowledge. This knowing-how is nothing eise but our under-
standing of predicates. 
There are two reasons why this conception of the understanding of predicates, 
which was meant as a concession to Wittgenstein, can't be attributed to him 
without restrictions. The first reason lies in the fact that Wittgenstein was not 
only sceptical about meaning entities, but also about mental states like know-
ing or intending. He was at least close to the behavioristic view that mental 
states or events are at most unimportant accompaniments of physical behavior 
and can be cancelled out of the analysis. This makes the distinction between in-
tentional and non-intentional behavior doubtful, for then one depends solely on 
the empirically manifest acts of speaking, and the distinction between correct 
and incorrect application instances of a predicate, as questioned by Kripke, can 
no longer be made. Wittgenstein thinks that the understanding of linguistic ex-
pression is not a mental process, for by a "mental process" he understands only 
phenomena such as the "decrease or increase of a Sensation of pain, the hearing 
of a melody, a sentence" (PI, §154). Of course, one can fix the meaning of the 
expression 'menial process' in this way, but then the claim that understanding 
is not a mental process does not entail that understanding is not psychological 
or mental in the usual sense of these words. Believing, desiring and intending 
are not mental processes in this narrow sense either, but, together with under-
standing, they are the main examples of those phenomena which we usually call 
"mental"; and so if taken in the sense of ordinary language—which according to 
Wittgenstein is basically sound and must be "off limits" to philosophy—it is 
nonsense to say that they are not mental. If I widerstand the word 'cello\ I have 
no special cello-feelings, of course, or feelings of understanding, I don't perceive 
anything, there is no manifest psychological State or mental process. But rather 
I know what the word means and can use it in the right way, or I know some-
thing about celli, for example, how they look and what they are good for, or I 
understand what someone means who uses this word, etc. That understanding is 
not a feeling or a perception is a bad argument for the claim that it is not men-
tal. Since the species of behaviorists today is practically extinct, there is no 
need for us to say anything further against the thesis that mental phenomena are 
reducible to observable behavior. 
The second difficulty in attributing the conception of understanding sketched 
above to Wittgenstein consists in the fact that he argues against the view that 
the understanding of an expression determines its future applications. He says: 
"The Steps [in our case: the future applications of a predicate] are really already 
taken, even before I take them in writing or orally or in thought". And it 
seemed as if they were in some unique way piedetermined, anticipated—as only 
the act of meaning can anticipate reality" (PI, §188). And: "It is as if we could 
grasp the whole use of the word in a flash" (PI, §191). He critically comments 
on these sentences as follows: "You have no model of this Superlative fact, but 
you are seduced into using a super-expression. (It might be called a philo-
sophical Superlative.)" (PI, §191). This is obviously a twofold confusion: The 
mastery of a technique is misinterpreted as determining future behavior as well 
as factual or imaginary execution in all particular cases. My present understand-
ing of a predicate F of course does not determine the applications which I will 
make of F in the future, it only fixes (intuitive or explicit) criteria for further 
applications. Moreover, it does not require that all possible applications of F are 
lying "before my eyes", that "properly speaking" I have realized them already. 
Mastery of a concept, the ability to discriminate objects with it, does not mean 
that one knows all its instances, and to know how to use a predicate does not 
mean to know every object to which it can be applied.1 2 The "singular predeter-
mination" by meaning or understanding, about which Wittgenstein speaks, is 
one of the most common things there are, only it must not be misinterpreted as 
a determination of future behavior, nor as a mental anticipation of all possible 
applications. If I know how to climb this means neither that I have already 
climbed in my imagination all the walls, ridges and chimneys, nor that my 
future behavior in climbing is determined. The choice of strategies, the 
understanding of a predicate is not some kind of "Superlative fact", and talk 
about it is no "super-expression", but it is something completely normal. Witt-
genstein applies the old trick of presenting the opponent's view as silly as pos-
sible and descrediting it verbally in order to save himself the trouble of sound 
argumentation. 
So the result is this: One can regard the understanding of a predicate by a 
person as a legitimate fact even if, in the spirit of Wittgenstein, one regards not 
Wittgenstein draws a parallel between the understanding of a predicate and the way 
in which we teach it other persons. He says: "But if a person has not yet got the 
concepts, I shall teach him to use the words by means of examples and by prac-
tice.—And when I do this I do not communicate less to him than I know myself' 
(PI, §208). If I understand the predicate then I know how to use it, I know its type 
of use. But I teach the Student only Single applications by help of which he has to 
grasp this general use. In this sense I teach him less than I know myself—at least 
in the sense of a technical knowledge, a competence. 
the meaning of linguistic expressions, but their use as fundamental. The sense 
of a word, however, then has to be determined not by its actual, but by its in-
tended use. Since nobody doubts that it is possible to know how to use a 
hammer, and since Wittgenstein likes to compare words with tools (cf. PI, 
§11), a Wittgensteinian can hardly deny that it is possible to know how to use a 
word. The direct Solution of the sceptical paradox consists therefore simply in 
pointing out that the sceptical argument is not sound because it gives no 
reasonable grounds for why the understanding of linguistic expressions, and the 
knowledge of how to use them, should not constitute a genuine fact. 
According to Kripke, a direct Solution to the paradox must satisfy two con-
ditions: it must (a) show a fact in the mental history of a person X which con-
stitutes her "meaning-something-with-predicate F\ and it must (b) show what 
justifies her in attributing F to a new object. We have already seen that con-
dition (a) is satisfiable: that X Widerstands or uses F in a certain way "consti-
tutes" X's "meaning-something-with F \ Concerning (b): What justifies me in 
applying F to a new object is that I use F for the description of objects of a 
special kind, and I believe that a is an object of this kind. The question how I 
know that I use F in this manner makes no more sense than the question how I 
know that I believe something: my own present intentions are as evident to me 
as my own present beliefs. I can doubt whether I understood the word 'cello' 
when I was six years old or whether I will still understand it in the same way as 
today when Fm 85 years, but I cannot doubt if I understand it now in the way I 
actually understand iL 
3. The Sceptical Solution 
The sceptical thesis says: it is not possible for someone to associate with a 
word a meaning which could determine how he should use this word in the 
future. A direct Solution to the paradox, as suggested above, consists in a 
critique of the justification of this thesis. A sceptical Solution, on the other 
hand, accepts the sceptical objection to the evidence usually brought forward for 
the opposing common sense thesis (that there are facts of meaning something 
with a word), but shows that it does not depend on this evidence, but rather may 
be justified—with eventual modifications—in a different way that is not affec-
ted by the sceptical objection (cf. WR, pp.66ff.). For example, the sceptical 
Solution of the problem of induction accepts that inductive inferences are neither 
logically, nor empirically justifiable, but points out that—under certain circum-
stances—they may be represented by valid conditional subjective probability 
Claims. In our case the sceptical Solution has to show first under which con-
ditions one may claim that somebody correctly applies a predicate in a particular 
case, and when one is justified to say that, if he applies it correctly, then he 
must attribute it to a certain object or cannot apply it to this object (WR, 
p. 108). The sceptical Solution has moreover to give criteria which teil us when 
someone understands a predicate. As a sceptical Solution it must be consistent 
with the assumption that for the Single Speaker there exist no facts in his prc-
vious behavior, nor in his mental history which could distinguish his applica-
tion of the predicate to a new case as correct, or which attests a certain under-
standing of the predicate (WR, p.89). Kripke's Solution consists in refering to 
the use within a linguistic Community /\The collective use in P is the criterion 
for whether the individual X has used it correctly. Thus, X uses the predicate F 
correctly if he uses it—at least mostly—in the way in which it is commonly 
used in P.If he does this, then we say he understands the predicate F. We can 
say, furthermore, that if somebody uses F correctly, then he has to apply or 
deny F to an object a if F is generally applied or denied to it by the members of 
P. 
The agreement in the use of a word in P is not explained by the fact that all 
members of P mean the same thing by this word, the contention is just the 
opposite: they mean the same thing by this word if they agree in their use of it. 
The collective practice is what constitutes meaning (cf. PI, §43) and hence that 
what makes meaning and linguistic understanding possible. A consequence of 
this approach then is the impossibility of private languages, i.e. those for 
which no collective use is defined; but I shall not go into this here. 
4. Critique of the Sceptical Solution 
The reference to a lingusitic Community and the collective use of words does not 
solve the sceptical problem, but only transfers it from the individuals to the 
Community. What is the "common use"? If it is a mode of use, then it deter-
mines the application of the predicate F also for new cases, i.e. for objects to 
which no member of P has so far attributed or denied the predicate F. In order to 
acquire this use we must be able as individuals to grasp it and to recognize how 
the word *F9 is used in P. But then we can also understand a word in the sense of 
understanding a certain type of its use, and thus the fact of individual understand-
ing, which the sceptical argument denies, must be accepted again. The result is 
not a sceptical, but rather a direct Solution. As in the case of the individual use 
of a word, also in the case of the general use in P, one must furthermore distin-
guish the factual from the correct use, for only the latter determines the meaning 
of the word. How should the correct use be determined, if not by reference to a 
common understanding of the word in PI However, the common understanding 
is the understanding which most members of P share. So, this line of reasoning 
leads us again to the recognition of individual understanding. 
White Wittgenstein recognizes, as we have seen, modes of an individual's use 
of words, Kripke doesn't. According to the latter, an individual's use of a word 
always consists in his past applications of i t In the step from the individual to 
collectives, use is suddenly understood in the sense of a mode of use. Wittgen-
stein and Kripke both formulate conditionals and speak about, "what the Com-
munity would do in these new cases" (PI, §692; WR, pp.95 and 111). A con-
sistent Kripkean sceptic should understand by the common use of a predicate F 
only its instances which have occurred so far.1 3 But these instances don't fix the 
application of F to a new object a. They are consistent with attributing F to Ö, 
as well as with denying F to af i.e. with interpreting the instances which have 
obtained so far as applications of a Goodman-like counterpart of F. Before one 
can sensibly speak of a general application of F to a new object, it is necessary 
that sufficiently many members of P perform this application in mutual agree-
ment. New F-statements are correct and meaningful only after they have been 
uttered by sufficienüy many people. On closer inspection, however, there are no 
generally accepted instances of use either, as we have seen, because these would 
be ways of using a predicate in talking about a specific object. 
Now Kripke does not hold a social-disposition theory of meaning (nor has he 
imputed one to Wittgenstein), because it would be confronted with the same 
objection he levelled in the individual case: one could then no longer distinguish 
between factual and correct uses of a predicate. But Kripke doesn't teil us how 
this distinction is to be reconstructed. Those requirements, the alleged unsatis-
fiability of which have served him in justifying the nonexistence of meaning in 
the individual case, are ignored in the collective case. What he now wants to 
emphasize is merely that the collective feels justified in correcting deviant 
applications of a predicate, and that such deviations are rare. From this it doesn't 
follow, he says, that the answer collectively given to an application problem is 
by definition correct; what follows is only the platitude that nobody feels justi-
fied in calling an application incorrect when almost everybody accepts i t This, 
then, is the meager remnant of the sceptical Solution. 
Thus, our result is this: Either one is a sceptic about individual modes of use 
of words, and simply denies that there is something like that, then one cannot 
speak of collective modes of use either, because the latter obviously are types of 
use in which the individuals agree. But, if only the instances of collective use 
exist, then we can also say in this case "Whatever is going to seem right to me 
is right. And that only means that here we can't talk about 4 night'" (PI, §258) . 
Or, one recognizes modes of use; then one can't accept these modes only for the 
collective—so to speak, as a "philosophical Superlative". For, if I can know 
how the members of my Community use a word, then I can also know how I 
Cf. also Blackburn (1984, p.291-96). 
myself, as one of them, use it now. I can grasp the rule and follow it. Thus, the 
sceptical Solution either solves nothing or it abolishes the problem which was 
tobesolved. 1 4 
In view of this modest result about the "most radical and original problem 
that philosophy has seen to date** (WR, p.60) , one can only comfort oneself 
with the words of Wittgenstein: *The results of philosophy are the uncovering 
of one or another piece of piain nonsense** (PI, §119). 
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